TORTS

-

NEGLIGENCE -

SOCIAL HOST HELD LIABLE FOR SERV-

ING LIQUOR TO INTOXICATED GUEST WHO CAUSES AUTO ACCI-

DENT INJURING THIRD PARTY -

Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538,

476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
The consumption of alcoholic beverages is as much a part of
American life today as it has been over the past three hundred
years.' Shrouded in mystery and myth,2 the use of alcohol in
America has met with extreme periods of unabashed social approval3 and absolute prohibition. 4 During the last fifty years, the
use of alcohol in moderation has been almost universally accepted in the United States as a legitimate social activity.' Modern concern regarding alcohol has centered on the problem of
overindulgence and consequential injuries suffered by the
drinker and by innocent third parties. 6 In an effort to combat this
problem, modern American society has responded in various
ways 7 - from instituting youth alcohol awareness programs' to
I See A. FLEMING, ALCOHOL: THE DELIGHTFUL POISON 95 (1975). For a complete discussion of the history of alcohol consumption in America, see id. at 47-96.
2 Id. at 111-20.
3 See id. at 61. Eighteenth century Americans considered alcoholic beverages
vital to ensure an individual's health and well-being. Id. The following language
explains the importance of alcoholic beverages in early America:
In the early days of the United States, most people thought that human
beings could not exist without alcohol. Men and women, old and
young, rich and poor, regularly started the day with a morning dram.
The drink might be anything from cherry brandy to wine mixed with
sugar and water, as long as it contained alcohol. A daily glass of "bitters" was considered essential for warding off disease, clearing the head,
and keeping the heart in good working order.
Id.
4 Id. at 81-96. The era of prohibition began in 1919 with the passage of the
eighteenth amendment and ended in 1933 with the passage of the twenty-first
amendment. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII with U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
5 M. HYDE, ALCOHOL: DRINK OR DRUG 2 (1974).
6

M.

CHAFETZ, LIQUOR: THE SERVANT OF MAN

6 (1965).

7 See Getting Straight, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1984, at 62-69. Alcoholics Anonymous
(AA), one of the most well-known organizations designed to aid the problem
drinker, was founded in 1935. Id. at 63. Membership in AA has more than tripled
since 1968, reaching a high of 586,000 in 1984. Id. at 62. The American Medical
Association and the United States Government have councils which study the
problems of alcohol abuse and make recommendations to counter it. See id. at 66.
In addition, many alcohol rehabilitation centers, including the Betty Ford Center
and the Palmer Drug Abuse Program, have been established to help combat the
problem of alcohol abuse. Id. at 66, 68. See generally Help for Those Who Drink Too
Much, CHANGING TIMES, Aug. 1984, at 63-66 (discussion of some other measures

society has taken to fight problem of alcohol abuse).
8 M. HYDE, supra note 5, at 124.
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imposing severe criminal penalties upon intoxicated drivers.'
These approaches have focused on affecting and reforming the
drinker himself, reflecting the traditional philosophy that responsibility for alcohol-related injuries lies primarily with the person
who has overindulged.' ° In a recent decision, which has generated unusual amounts of public interest and controversy," application of that traditional concept was drastically limited by the
New Jersey Supreme Court. 12 In Kelly v. Gwinnell,' 3 the supreme
court held a social host liable for negligently serving liquor to an
intoxicated adult guest who subsequently injured a third party in
an automobile accident.' 4
At approximately 5:15 p.m. on the afternoon of January 11,
1980, Donald Gwinnell, a Middletown painting contractor, left
his home in response to a request for assistance from Joseph Zak,
whose truck was bogged down on a muddy road.' 5 Because efforts to free the truck were unsuccessful, Gwinnell offered to
drive Zak home in his own automobile. 16 Upon their arrival, Zak
invited Gwinnell into his house for a drink.' 7 Gwinnell stayed
with Zak and his wife at their home until approximately 8:45
p.m.' 8 When Gwinnell decided to leave, Zak accompanied him to
his automobile, chatted with him briefly, and watched him drive
off into the night.' 9 Minutes after leaving the Zaks' home, Gwinnell was involved in an automobile accident with Marie Kelly,
who sustained serious injuries.2
Gwinnell maintained that he had consumed only two2 or
three drinks of scotch over ice on the evening of the accident '
9

See, e.g., N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 39:4-50

(West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985).

10 Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 101, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (Sup. Ct. 1975),

aFd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976); Comment, Social Host Liability for
FurnishingAlcohol: A Legal Hangover?, 10 PAC. L.J. 95, 96 (1978).
11 Hosts Liable in Drunk Crashes, Star-Ledger, June 28, 1984, at 1, col. 3; Playingthe
Party Host While Avoiding Liability, Star-Ledger, July 3, 1984, at 1, col. 5; A Study on
Host Liability, Star-Ledger, July 14, 1984, at 3, col. 4; Legal Rulings Befuddle Liability of
Party Hosts, Star-Ledger, Aug. 12, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
12 Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 548, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (1984).
13 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
14 Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
15 Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 N.J. Super. 320, 321, 463 A.2d 387, 388 (App. Div.
1983), rev'd and remanded, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
16 Id. at 321, 463 A.2d at 388.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
20 Id. Kelly sustained a concussion, jaw injuries, and a broken ankle. Hosts Liable
in Drunk Crashes, Star-Ledger, June 28, 1984, at 27, col. 3.
21 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
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a contention attested to by Zak and his wife.2 2 In addition, Zak
stated that at no time prior to Gwinnell's departure did he perceive that Gwinnell was intoxicated.2 3 Tests administered to
Gwinnell after the collision, however, revealed that his blood alcohol content at the time of the accident was 0.286%,24 which
was over two and one-half times the level that renders a driver
legally intoxicated in New Jersey. 2 5 Kelly's expert witness testified that a blood alcohol content of 0.286% indicated that Gwinnell had not simply indulged in two or three drinks that evening,
but rather had consumed approximately thirteen drinks before
driving home.2 6
Kelly subsequently filed suit for the injuries she sustained,
naming Gwinnell and the owner of the automobile, Paragon Corporation, as codefendants. 2 7 Paragon Corporation in turn filed a
third-party complaint against the Zaks, alleging that they had
been negligent in allowing Gwinnell to drive from their home in
an intoxicated state. 28 Kelly later amended her complaint to include the Zaks as primary defendants. 2 9 The trial court granted
the Zaks' motion for summary judgment on the question of host
liability.3 The appellate division affirmed, holding that, as a matter of law, a social host could not be held liable for harm to third
parties caused by intoxicated guests who were involved in automobile accidents. 3 On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed and held that a social host who serves liquor to an adult
guest, knowing that the guest is intoxicated and will soon be driving, is liable for injuries to third parties caused by that guest's
negligent operation of a motor vehicle due to intoxication. 2 The
supreme court then remanded the matter for a factual determination of whether the Zaks should have been held liable for causing
22

Id.

Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 N.J. Super. 320, 321, 463 A.2d 387, 388 (App. Div.
1983), rev'd and remanded, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
24 Id. Kelly secured the services of a chemist to determine Gwinnell's blood alcohol content at the time of the crash based on the tests administered to Gwinnell
immediately following the accident. Id.
25 A blood alcohol content of 0.10% is conclusive evidence of driving while intoxicated. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985).
26 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
27 Id. at 541-42, 476 A.2d at 1220-21.
28 Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 N.J. Super. 320, 321, 463 A.2d 387, 388 (App. Div.
1983), rev'd and remanded, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
29 Id.
23

30

Id.

31
32

Id. at 325-26, 463 A.2d at 390-91.
Kelly, 96 N.J. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
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the injuries sustained by Kelly. 33
At common law it was not a tort to furnish liquor to an
otherwise ordinary and able-bodied person. 34 The belief was that
the consumption of alcoholic beverages, and not the service of
them, was the proximate cause of any alcohol-related injury.35
With the advent of prohibition, 6 however, New Jersey enacted a
statute which imposed strict liability on the seller of alcoholic
beverages where the sale resulted in injury.37 After the repeal of
prohibition, 38 that statute was replaced by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act,3 9 which delineated - albeit not clearly - the
specific duties of persons who served alcoholic beverages.40
Although the repeal of the prohibition-era statute did not preclude liability for negligent service of alcoholic beverages, 4 ' the
question of whether servers of liquor might be held liable for alcohol-related accidents remained unaddressed for over twentyfive years. 42
In New Jersey, the development of liability for the negligent
provision of alcohol demonstrates ajudicial sensitivity to the conflicting policy considerations present in cases involving intoxicated minors as opposed to adults,43 and those involving
33 Id. at 560, 476 A.2d at 1230. On remand the Kelly litigation was settled. Settlement Ends Landmark Case Under Host Liability, Star-Ledger, Feb. 21, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
The settlement required Kelly to receive $100,000 from Gwinnell and $72,500
from the Zaks. Id.
34 See, e.g., Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 101, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (Sup. Ct.
1975), aff'd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976).
35 Id.
36 Prohibition was effected in 1919 by the eighteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution, which provided that "[a]fter one year from the ratification of
this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within,
the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and
all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
37 Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 200, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959) (citing 1921 N.J.
Laws ch.103, § 55).
38 Prohibition was repealed in 1933 by the twenty-first amendment to the United
States Constitution. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXI, § 1.
39 N.J. REV. STAT. § 33:1 (1937).
40 See, e.g., Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966);
Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 201, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959); Linn v. Rand, 140
N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976).
41 See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 201, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959).
42 Prohibition was repealed in 1933. See supra note 4. In 1959, Rappaport, a case
of first impression for the New Jersey Supreme Court, presented the question of
whether a tavern owner could be held liable for negligently serving an intoxicated
minor. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 193, 156 A.2d 1, 4 (1959).
43 See, e.g., Kelly, 96 N.J. at 545-46 & 556 n. 14, 476 A.2d at 1222-23 & 1228 n.14;
see also, e.g., id. at 561 n.1, 476 A.2d at 1230-31 n.l (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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negligent commercial licensees as opposed to social hosts.4 4 The
New Jersey Supreme Court first considered imposition of liability
for the negligent service of alcoholic beverages in Rappaport v.
Nichols.4 5 In Rappaport, a minor named Robert Nichols had been
served intoxicating beverages at four different taverns in Newark.4 6 Nichols became inebriated and subsequently was involved
in an automobile accident in which Arthur Rappaport was
killed.4 7 Rappaport's administratrix brought suit against each of
the four tavern owners alleging, inter alia,4 8 that their negligent
service of liquor to Nichols had contributed to the wrongful
death of Rappaport.49 The lower courts sustained the tavern
owners' motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff
had failed to state a cause of action.50
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed. 5 ' It
opined that a regulation promulgated by the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control supported the plaintiff's claim of negligence." That regulation prohibited commercial licensees from
serving liquor to a minor or to any " 'actually or apparently intoxicated' " person,53 but it provided no directive for liability if a
licensee ignored its mandate.54 The Rappaport court reasoned
that the regulation was promulgated for the protection of the
general public, as well as for the protection of minors and intoxicated persons.55 It stated that the sale of alcohol to minors and to
persons already intoxicated not only was unlawful, but also
presented a clear and foreseeable danger to the traveling pub44 Compare Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 592, 218 A.2d 630,
636 (1966) (tavern owner liable to third parties for negligent service of alcohol to
clearly intoxicated person) with Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn, Inc., 121 N.J. Super.
525, 534, 298 A.2d 84, 88 (App. Div. 1972) (refusing to recognize cause of action
for negligent service of alcohol in social setting), certif denied, 62 N.J. 334, 301 A.2d
449 (1973).
45 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
46 Id. at 192, 156 A.2d at 3.
47 Id.
48 In addition to bringing suit against the tavern owners, the plaintiff brought
suit against the minor Nichols and an adult patron who had purchased liquor for
Nichols at two of the taverns. See id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 193, 156 A.2d at 3.
51 Id. at 205-06, 156 A.2d at 10.
52 See id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8. The statutory basis for this regulation is N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 33:1-39 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985). Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d
15, 17 n.7 (3d Cir. 1961).
53 Rappaport, 31 N.J. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8.
54 See Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15, 17-18 (3d Cir. 1961) (explaining New
Jersey courts' creation of action based on violation of regulation).
55 Rappaport, 31 N.J. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8.
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lic. 56 Therefore, the supreme court unanimously ruled that a tav-

ern owner who served a person he knew or should have known
was a minor, or a person he knew was intoxicated, subjected himself to a claim of common law negligence.5 7
The next development concerning the potential liability of a
commercial host occurred in Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc.58 In
that case, the decedent, John Soronen, had been drinking for at
least four hours when he entered the Olde Milford Inn at 1:00
p.m. 59 While at the Inn, Soronen was served two shots of whiskey
and three beers.6" At about 3:00 p.m. he rose from his bar chair,
took a few steps, and fell, sustaining head injuries which proved
to be fatal. 6 His widow brought an action against the Inn, alleging that its negligence in serving liquor to Soronen while he was
visibly intoxicated was a legal cause of his death. 62 At the first
trial, the court dismissed the action, ruling that there was no evidence from which a jury could find that the bartender knew or
should have known that the decedent was intoxicated. 6 3 The appellate division reversed and remanded, holding that there was
sufficient evidence for a jury determination. 6 In addition, the appellate division flatly rejected the defendant's claim that the decedent's contributory negligence precluded liability.6 5 On retrial,
a verdict was rendered in the plaintiffs favor.6 6 The defendant
appealed, but the supreme court granted certification before the
appellate division heard oral argument.6 7
The supreme court upheld the plaintiffs cause of action,6 8
but it ordered a retrial so that the jury could be clearly instructed
that the defendant's civil responsibility revolved around whether
it provided liquor to a person who was visibly intoxicated. 69 The
Id. at 202-03, 156 A.2d at 8.
Id. The defendant, however, was free to prove that he acted reasonably under
the circumstances. Id. at 203, 156 A.2d at 9.
58 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
59 Id. at 584, 218 A.2d at 631. Soronen had been seen drinking at another tavern
at 8:30 a.m. and again at his home later that morning. Id.
60 Id., 218 A.2d at 631-32.
61 Id., 218 A.2d at 632.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 84 N.J. Super. 372, 382, 202 A.2d 208, 213
(App. Div. 1964), rev'd, 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
65 Id. at 378, 202 A.2d at 211.
66 Soronen, 46 N.J. at 584, 218 A.2d at 631.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 594, 218 A.2d at 637.
69 Id. at 594-95, 218 A.2d at 637.
56
57
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court stated that the policy considerations set forth in Rappaport
were "readily adaptable" to the case before it. 70 Accordingly, an
action for damages could be based on the claim that a tavern
owner created an unreasonable risk of harm by continuing to
serve a patron whom he knew or should have known was intoxicated. 7 The Soronen court broadened the post-Rappaportscope of
responsibility by holding that commercial licensees were potentially liable for injury to the customer himself. 72 In addition, the

supreme court held that contributory negligence was not available to tavern owners as a defense because an intoxicated person
was "in no position to exercise self-protective care." ' 73 Finally,
the supreme court recognized that the plaintiff carried the burden of proving that the defendant knew or should have known
that the decedent was intoxicated. The defendant tavern owner
thus could protect himself from liability by showing that his7 4bartenders exercised reasonable care under the circumstances.
In 1976, the New Jersey Superior Court examined the possible liability of a social host for serving liquor to a minor.75 In Linn
v. Rand,76 Thomas Nacnodovitz served alcoholic beverages to
Lucy Rand, a minor, and allowed her to drive home.77 While
driving home, Rand struck and seriously injured Glenn Linn, an
infant.7 8 Linn's guardian ad litem brought suit against
Nacnodovitz for contributing to Linn's injuries. 79 The court,
however, agreed with Nacnodovitz's assertion that as a matter of
law he was under no duty to the plaintiff; accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. 0
The appellate division reversed, 8 ' holding that the plaintiff's
Id. at 587, 218 A.2d at 633.
71 See id.
72 Id. at 592, 218 A.2d at 636.
70

73

Id.

Id. at 593-94, 218 A.2d at 636-37. In order to show that he exercised reasonable care, the tavern owner must prove that the circumstances were not such that
he knew or should have known that the patron was intoxicated. See id. at 594, 218
A.2d at 637.
75 Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976).
76 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976).
77 Id. at 214, 356 A.2d at 16.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 215, 356 A.2d at 16-17.
81 Id. at 220, 356 A.2d at 20. The appellate division criticized the trial judge for
giving too little consideration to the facts. See id. at 215, 356 A.2d at 17. The trial
judge, relying on Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 525, 298 A.2d
84 (App. Div. 1972), certif denied, 62 N.J. 334, 301 A.2d 449 (1973), stated:
In Anslinger the Appellate Division held that liability in negligence for
74
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suit was not barred under New Jersey law.82 The appellate court
opined that it would make little sense to hold commercial licensees liable for negligent service of liquor to a minor while freeing
social hosts from liability for the same wrongful conduct.8 3 Furthermore, the court reasoned that any existing immunity from
liability for the negligent service of liquor to a minor should be
removed. 84 Consequently, it determined that the plaintiff could
sustain a cause of action by proving the following: (1) that Rand
was a minor; (2) that Nacnodovitz knew she was a minor and
would soon be driving; (3) that Nacnodovitz nevertheless served
Rand liquor to the point where she was unfit to drive; (4) that
injury to Rand or others was reasonably foreseeable; and (5) that
Nacnodovitz's negligence was a proximate cause of Linn's injuries. 8 5 The appellate court noted that although the burden of
proving negligence might be greater in the case of social hosts
than in the case of commercial licensees, that fact should not
have barred
what was otherwise a perfectly valid cause of
6
action.

8

The liability of a social host for negligently serving intoxicating beverages to an adult was first addressed by a New Jersey
court in Figuly v. Knoll. 7 In Figuly, the defendant, Longfield,
hosted a party at which the codefendant, Knoll, was served approximately twelve alcoholic drinks. 88 Knoll became intoxicated
and was subsequently involved in an automobile accident in
which the plaintiff was injured. 89 The plaintiff brought an action
against both Knoll and Longfield. 9 ° Upholding the validity of the
plaintiff's action, the law division reasoned that prior New Jersey
law provided "no reasonable basis" for limiting liability to hosts
the sale or serving of alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons or minors is specifically limited to tavern keepers or to those in a strictly business setting. The Appellate Division refused to hold quasi-business
organizations liable for the actions of drunken guests at their social
affairs.
Linn, 140 N.J. Super. at 215, 356 A.2d at 17.
82 Linn, 140 N.J. Super. at 216, 356 A.2d at 17. The court noted that "[t]he
forward-looking and far-reaching philosophy expressed in Rappaport should also be
applicable to negligent social hosts." Id.
83 Id. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18.
84 Id. at 220, 356 A.2d at 19.
85 Id. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18.
86 Id.

185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (Law Div. 1982).
Id. at 479, 449 A.2d at 564.
89 Id. at 478-79, 449 A.2d at 564.
90 See id. at 479, 449 A.2d at 564.
87

88
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who served minors as opposed to adult guests. 9 ' The court concluded that, if Longfield had been able to discern Knoll's drunkenness but did not prevent Knoll from driving, then Longfield
might have breached a duty owed to Figuly and to the general
public.9 2 The decision in Figuly, however, was never appealed.9 3
Within two years of Figuly, the same issue concerning social
host liability was addressed by the appellate division in Kelly v.
Gwinnell. 94 Faced with facts similar to those in Figuly,95 the appellate division nevertheless decided that a social host could not be
held liable for negligently serving liquor to an adult guest. 9 6 It
was against this background of conflict with Figuly that the Kelly
case was appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
The Kelly majority began its analysis by noting that the appellate division's decision not to hold the Zaks liable for Marie
Kelly's injuries was based on the reluctance of other states to impose similar liability.9 7 While other states may have policy reasons for exempting social hosts from liability, the supreme court
recognized that such immunity is not the natural product of conventional negligence analysis. 9 8 The traditional test for negligence, as articulated by the court, was "whether [a] reasonably
prudent person at the time and place should recognize and foresee an unreasonable risk or likelihood of harm or danger to
others." 9' 9 The supreme court, "viewing the facts most favorably
to [the] plaintiff,"' 0 0 determined that "one could reasonably conclude" the Zaks knew that Gwinnell was intoxicated on the eve91 Id. at 480, 449 A.2d at 565. The Figuly court also relied on the California
Supreme Court's decision in Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 154-55,
577 P.2d 669, 674-75, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 539-40 (1978) (upholding cause of action against social host serving intoxicating beverages). The Figuly court, however,
failed to mention that the Coulter decision was subsequently overruled by the California Legislature. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1984).
92 See Figuly, 185 N.J. Super. at 479, 449 A.2d at 564.
93 Klein v. Raysinger, Pa. -, 470 A.2d 507, 509 (1983).
94 190 N.J. Super. 320, 463 A.2d 387 (App. Div. 1983), rev'd and remanded, 96 N.J.
538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
95 Compare supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text (Kelly facts) with supra notes
88-90 and accompanying text (Figuly facts).
96 Kelly, 190 N.J. Super. at 325-26, 463 A.2d at 390-91.
97 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 542, 476 A.2d at 1221.
98 Id. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1221. More specifically, the court stated that the "immunization of [social] hosts is not the inevitable result of the law of negligence, for
conventional negligence analysis points strongly in exactly the opposite direction."
Id.
99 Id.
100 This

view of the facts was necessitated because Kelly's complaint had been
dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. Id.
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ning of the accident.'
The court also found that the Zaks knew
Gwinnell would soon be driving in that condition.0 2 Thus, the
court observed, the defendants helped to create an unreasonable
risk of harm by serving Gwinnell excessive amounts of liquor and
by allowing him to drive while intoxicated. 10 3 Since traditional
negligence analysis pointed in favor of liability, the only remaining question was whether the Zaks had a duty to prevent the risk
they had helped to create. 0 4
In the court's opinion, the decision of whether or not to impose such a duty on social hosts serving alcoholic beverages to
adult guests was a question of fairness"' and state policy.' 0 6 The
majority perceived that combating the problem of drunken driving was a major state concern, 10 7 and it viewed the problem as a
strong consideration in favor of imposing a duty of care on the
Zaks and other social hosts.'0 8 Furthermore, the majority believed that past New Jersey decisions supported the imposition
on social hosts of a duty to exercise care when serving liquor to
adult guests. i09 To corroborate that position, the court cited Rappaport, which had imposed on commercial licensees a common
law duty to refrain from serving minors," 0 and Soronen, which
had imposed a duty on licensees to refrain from serving visibly
intoxicated persons."' In addition, the Kelly majority noted that
Linn had extended the duty that had been created in Rappaport to
social hosts." 12 The court approved Linn, 1 3 and it observed that
the case before it also involved a social settingii 4 and thus em10i Id.
102 See id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928)).
106 Id. (citing Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293
(1962)).
107 Id. at 545 & n.3, 476 A.2d at 1222 & n.3 (describing social cost of alcohol
related accidents and deaths in New Jersey) (citing NEW JERSEY Div. OF MOTOR VEHICLES, SAFETY SERVICE INTEGRITY: A REPORT ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, APRIL 1, 1982 THROUGH MARCH 31,
1983, at 45 (1983)).
108 See id. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222 ("[T]he imposition of a duty is both consistent
with and supportive of a social goal - the reduction of drunken driving - that is
practically unanimously accepted by society.").
109 Id.
110 See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
IlI See supra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
112

See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 546, 476 A.2d at 1223.

13 Id. at 547, 476 A.2d at 1223.
114

See id. at 546-47, 476 A.2d at 1223. Compare supra notes 75-78 and accompany-
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bodied practically the same policy considerations as that case.11 5
Consequently, the majority found no reason to distinguish between the social host/adult guest scenario of Kelly and the situations presented in Rappaport, Soronen, and Linn." 6
Based on these considerations, the court held that a social
host who serves alcoholic beverages to an adult guest, knowing
that the guest is intoxicated and soon will be driving, can be held
liable for all third party injuries that result from that guest's negligent operation of an automobile."t 7 Although the majority acknowledged that its ruling might disrupt normal social behavior
and lessen the enjoyment of social gatherings, it believed that the
benefit to society resulting from its decision would far outweigh
the detriment." 8 To further justify its position, the court analogized the liability imposed by its decision to the liability presently
imposed by other jurisdictions upon persons who lend their
automobiles to visibly intoxicated persons.' The majority found
no persuasive distinction between the two situations, and it perceived the risks created in each to be of similar gravity. 2 '
The court then addressed the arguments that had been advanced against imposing liability on social hosts for the negligent
service of liquor to adult guests.' 2 ' The majority first rejected the
ing text (discussing facts of Linn decision) with supra notes 16-21 and accompanying
text (discussing facts of Kelly decision).
115 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 546-47, 476 A.2d at 1223. Comparing Kelly to Linn, the court
noted that in Linn
[there] was a social setting at someone's home, not at a tavern; the one
who provided the liquor to the intoxicated minor was a host, not a licensee; and all of the notions of fault and causation pinning sole responsibility on the drinker were present. The only difference was that the
guest was a minor....
Id. at 546, 476 A.2d at 1223.
116 See id. at 547-48, 476 A.2d at 1224.
''7 Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
118 Id. More specifically, the majority explained:
While we recognize the concern that our ruling will interfere with accepted standards of social behavior; will intrude on and somewhat diminish the enjoyment, relaxation, and camaraderie that accompany
social gatherings at which alcohol is served; and that such gatherings
and social relationships are not simply tangential benefits of a civilized
society but are regarded by many as important, we believe that the
added assurance ofjust compensation to the victims of drunken driving
as well as the added deterrent effect of the rule on such driving outweigh the importance of those other values.
Id.
119 Id. at 549, 476 A.2d at 1224.
120 Id., 476 A.2d at 1224-25.
121 See id. at 549-55, 559, 476 A.2d at 1225-28, 1230.

19851

NOTES

627

claim that such an imposition is disproportionate to the fault of
social hosts, stating that such a contention implies the questionable social judgment that a host who serves liquor in a negligent
manner has not committed a serious wrong. 122 The majority also
opined that, in light of the risk of death or injury to guests and
third parties, it is relatively easy
for a social host to refrain from
3
negligently serving liquor.12

The majority next considered the argument that, absent adequate insurance protection, imposition of liability might result in
the loss of a host's home. 124 First, the court stated that a typical
homeowners' insurance policy would cover such a situation. 125
Second, it noted that if only one spouse were liable, and the liability exceeded the policy limits, jointly owned property would
not be lost because creditors could not reach the interest of the
non-liable spouse. 126 Finally, the court reasoned that, in view of a
severe injury to a totally innocent third party, the loss of a home
might be an appropriate penalty for a negligent host. 2 7 The
court did, however, lighten the burden of its holding on homeowners 2by
limiting application of its decision to prospective
8
events. 1

The majority stated that its goal was to assure fair compensa129
tion for victims who are injured as a result of drunken driving.
It also hoped to reduce the number of injuries and fatalities
caused by intoxicated drivers by making it "more likely" that social hosts will exercise greater care when serving alcoholic beverages to their guests. 3 ' Although this deterring effect was a
desired result, the Kelly court believed that its goal of fair com3
pensation provided a sufficient justification for its decision.1 '
The court next rejected the argument that the decision to
Id. at 549, 476 A.2d at 1225.
Id. at 549-50, 476 A.2d at 1225.
124 See id. at 550, 476 A.2d at 1225.
125 Id.; see also id. at 550 n.9, 476 A.2d at 1225 n.9 (responding to dissent and
stating that critical issue is not whether present policies cover host liability, but
whether tort law should spread risk of loss through use of insurance rather than
imposing entire risk on innocent victim).
126 Id. at 550, 476 A.2d at 1225 (citing Newman v. Chase, 70 N.J. 254, 266, 359
A.2d 474, 480 (1976); King v. Greene, 30 N.J. 395, 153 A.2d 49 (1959)).
127 See id. at 550-51, 476 A.2d at 1225.
128 Id. at 551, 476 A.2d at 1225. The majority noted that, by giving its decision
prospective application only, homeowners and apartment dwellers would have a
reasonable opportunity to obtain adequate liability insurance. Id.
129 Id., 476 A.2d at 1226.
130 Id.
'31 See id. at 551-52, 476 A.2d at 1226.
122
123
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impose liability on social hosts should be left for the legislature. 32 Rather, it pointed out that determinations concerning the
"scope of duty in negligence cases [have] traditionally been a
function of the judiciary." 33 The majority cited Linn as an example of a case in which thejudiciary had imposed a duty absent any
prior legislative activity. 13 The absence of an adverse reaction to
the Linn decision by the New Jersey Legislature was interpreted
by the court as legislative assent to judicial involvement in this
area of the law.' 35 The fact that courts in most other states have
deferred to their legislatures on the question of social host liability did not convince the Kelly majority that it should do the
same.'3 6 The court noted that in most of the jurisdictions
wherein courts have deferred to the legislature, dram shop
acts' 3 7 have previously been enacted.' 38 The Kelly majority concluded that the presence of a dram shop law indicates that those
state legislatures are interested and active in the area, a fact
which justifies deference to the law-making body.' 39 The court
reasoned that the absence of a New Jersey dram shop law - coupled with the New Jersey Legislature's apparent acceptance of
Rappaport, Soronen, and Linn - indicates that the Legislature is
amenable to its action. 140 The majority afforded little weight to
the argument that the Legislature possesses superior knowledge
and investigative resources. 14 1 Instead, the Kelly court rationalized its position by stating that, if the Legislature determines that
the imposition of 1liability
is improper, it has the power to over42
rule the decision.

The majority continued its discussion by denying that its decision would have an "extraordinary" impact on "the average cit132

See id. at 552-55, 476 A.2d at 1226-28.

133 Id. at 552, 476 A.2d at 1226.
134 Id. at 553, 476 A.2d at 1226.
135 See id.

See id. at 553-54, 476 A.2d at 1227.
In general, a dram shop act is a civil liability statute that imposes liability on
one whose sale of alcoholic beverages legally causes the buyer to injure a third
136
137

party.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

444 (5th ed. 1979).

Kelly, 96 N.J. at 553, 476 A.2d at 1226 (citing Kowal v. Hofher, 181 Conn.
355, 436 A.2d 1 (1980); Behnke v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App. 219, 175 N.W.2d 303
(1970); Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982)) (further
citations omitted).
139 Id. at 554, 476 A.2d at 1227 ("very existence of a Dram Shop Act constitutes a
substantial argument against expansion of the legislatively-mandated liability").
140 See id.at 553-55, 476 A.2d at 1226-28.
14' Id. at 553-55, 558, 476 A.2d at 1226-29.
142 Id. at 555, 476 A.2d at 1227.
138
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izen." 1 43 The court expressed its belief that social hosts already
monitor their guests' drinking, and it reiterated the contention
that homeowners' insurance would cover the liability incurred by
social hosts as the result of its decision.14 4 Furthermore, the Kelly
majority noted that liability is limited to hosts who directly serve
visibly intoxicated guests, knowing that those guests will soon be
driving home. 4 5 The court stressed that injuries for which a host
can be held liable must result directly from a guest's intoxication
and not from some other cause. 1 46 It emphasized that its narrow
holding made fears of a deluge of host-related lawsuits
1 47
unfounded.
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Garibaldi expressed fear
that the duty imposed by the majority might expose social hosts
to undue financial burdens.' 48 In addition, she believed that the
"almost limitless implications" of the majority's decision render
the question of host liability more appropriate for legislative resolution. ' 49 Reminding the court of her historically strong posture
against drunken driving,' 5 0 Justice Garibaldi nevertheless questioned the wisdom of creating a cause of action that is not recognized by any other state judiciary. 5 ' Although she recognized
that New Jersey courts have previously imposed liability on com152
mercial licensees, as well as on social hosts who serve minors,
Justice Garibaldi stated that those decisions were supported by
specific statutory provisions. 53 In contrast, the dissent perceived
no such legislation supporting the type of liability created by the

146

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

147

Id.

143
144
145

554, 476 A.2d at
554-55, 476 A.2d
556, 476 A.2d at
559, 476 A.2d at

1227.
at 1227.
1228.
1230.

Id. at 560, 476 A.2d at 1230 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
149 Id.
150 See id. (citing In re Kallen, 92 N.J. 14, 455 A.2d 460 (1983)).
151 See id. at 561, 476 A.2d at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). In 1970, the Oregon Supreme Court created a duty on the part of a social host to refrain from
serving a guest under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not allow
the guest to continue drinking. Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau
Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 639-40, 485 P.2d 18, 21-22 (1970). This cause of
action was subsequently limited by the Oregon Legislature, which provided that
"[n]o private host is liable for damages incurred or caused by an intoxicated social
guest unless the private host has served or provided alcoholic beverages to a social
guest when such guest was visibly intoxicated." OR. REv. STAT. § 30.955 (1981).
But see Kelly, 96 N.J. at 554 n.13, 476 A.2d at 1227 n.13.
152 See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 560-61, 476 A.2d at 1230 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing
Rappaport and Linn).
153 Id. at 560-61 & n.l, 476 A.2d at 1230-31 & n.1 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
148
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Kelly majority. 54
Justice Garibaldi noted that most state courts have reasoned
that the legislature is best suited to study the propriety of imposing such far-reaching liability and have therefore left the determination of host liability to their respective legislatures. 155 A
legislature, she observed, may hold hearings, conduct debates,
and organize investigations to determine if the imposition of liability properly serves public policy. 156 Justice Garibaldi stated
that the majority had acted "with seemingly scant knowledge and
little care for the possible negative consequences of its decision." 157 She also questioned the majority's belief that the court's
decision was necessary to ensure full recovery to the victims of
drunken drivers. 158 She noted that the New Jersey Legislature
has already enacted broad automobile insurance statutes
designed to assure that persons injured on the state's highways
will always be fully compensated.' 59 Whether or not those statutes actually provide full compensation for the victims of
drunken driving was uncertain, but Justice Garibaldi perceived
that such a determination should properly be made by the Legislature after a detailed study. 160 The dissent recognized that the
court's holding might help to provide full recovery for victims
under very limited circumstances,' 6' but it disapproved of the
154 See id. at 561, 565, 476 A.2d at 1230-31, 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The
dissent agreed with the Kelly majority's approval of Linn. Id. at 561 n. l, 476 A.2d at
1230 n. 1 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi, however, saw an important
distinction between a social host who negligently serves a minor and the situation
presented in Kelly. Id. The distinction the dissent drew between Linn and Kelly was
"based on the clearly and frequently expressed legislative policy that minors should
not drink alcoholic beverages . . . and on the fact that minors occupy a special
place in our society and traditionally have been protected by state regulation from
the consequences of their own immaturity." Id. (citation omitted). But see id. at 556
n. 14, 476 A.2d at 1228 n.14 (finding dissent's distinction "difficult to understand"
and stating that difference between Kelly and Linn is "simply one of degree").
155 Id. at 561-63, 476 A.2d at 1231-32 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp., 460 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1978); Cole v. City of Spring Lake
Park, 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982); Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash.
2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969)) (further citations omitted).
156 Id. (citing Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 505, 244 N.W.2d 65, 70 (1976))
(further citations omitted).
157 Id. at 563, 476 A.2d at 1232 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
158 See id. at 564, 476 A.2d at 1232-33 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
159 See id., 476 A.2d at 1232 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
160 Id., 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
161 Id. More specifically, the dissent stated that the only situation in which the
majority's holding would provide a remedy unavailable under the insurance laws is
a situation in which the intoxicated driver is insolvent and both the intoxicated
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majority's hasty and uninformed decision. 16 2
Justice Garibaldi approved of the liability imposed on commercial licensees in prior decisions, but she was not convinced
that those decisions warranted imposition of similar liability on
social hosts.' 63 The dissent discussed a number of practical distinctions between commercial licensees and social hosts, which
tend to support the imposition of liability on the former but not
on the latter.' 64 Commercial licensees, she noted, have more experience than social hosts in perceiving drunken behavior and
therefore possess an "expertise" in determining the degree of a
person's intoxication. 16 5 Moreover, the dissent pointed out that,
in contrast to social hosts, commercial licensees generally do not
drink while they are serving alcohol and thus are better able to
detect drunkenness. 66 Justice Garibaldi also cited the ease with
which a bartender can stop serving a drunken patron as a significant difference between commercial licensees and social hosts.' 67
The dissent noted that, although "[i]t is easy to say that a social
host can just refuse to serve the intoxicated person, . . . [w]e
should not ignore the social pressures of requiring a social host
to tell a boss, client, friend, neighbor, or family member that he
is not going to serve him another drink."' 6 8
Furthermore, Justice Garibaldi cited medical evidence that
alcohol affects everyone differently,' 6 9 and she questioned the
ability of the average host to recognize precisely when a guest is
"obviously intoxicated."' 7 0 She commented that it takes time for
alcohol to enter the bloodstream' 7 ' and that, in addition, there
are persons who manifest no outward signs of drunkenness when
they are, in fact, intoxicated. 17 2 Moreover, the dissent charged
that objective tests administered after an accident, which indicate
driver and the victim are uninsured motorists. Id., 476 A.2d at 1232-33 (Garibaldi,

J., dissenting).

See id. at 563, 476 A.2d at 1232 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
See id. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 165-67, 178-84 and accompanying text.
Kelly, 96 N.J. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Id. at 566-67, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Id. at 567, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 565-66, 476 A.2d at 1233-34 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting) (citing Perr, Blood
Alcohol Levels and "Diminished Capacity", 3 J. LEGAL MED. 28 (1975)).
170 See id. at 566, 476 A.2d at 1233-34 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); cf. Comment,
supra note 10, at 103 ("determination that an individual is obviously intoxicated not
so obvious after all").
171 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 566, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
172 Id.; accord Comment, supra note 10, at 103.
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
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that a party guest was legally intoxicated, do not necessarily prove
that the guest appeared to be drunk in the subjective eye of the
social host. 1 73 The dissent recognized that, although the majority
purported to base liability on the subjective knowledge of the
host, in actuality the majority relied on the objective results of a
blood test to conclude that Gwinnell must have appeared visibly
intoxicated to the Zaks.1 74 justice Garibaldi also criticized the majority's failure to delineate the extent to which a social host must
monitor the drinking of guests and the extent to which a host
must attempt to prevent intoxicated guests from driving. 175 This
imprecision, the dissent intoned, coupled with the almost impossible duties which the decision placed on social hosts, would inevitably open the door for many "speculative and subjective"
impositions of host liability. 176
The dissent then outlined other compelling policy reasons
for distinguishing imposition of liability in commercial situations
from the social host scenario presented in Kelly. 1 7 7 Justice Garibaldi noted that commercial licensees are the subject of specific
legislative prohibitions; therefore, she reasoned that it made
sense to hold commercial licensees liable for ignoring specific
statutes and regulations.17 8 A host's service of liquor to adult
guests, however, is not subject to such regulation. 17 ' Furthermore, in the opinion ofJustice Garibaldi, the most important distinction between a commercial licensee and a social host was the
ability of a licensee to distribute the costs of liability among his
customers. 8 0 By charging customers more per drink in order to
cover the added costs of potential liability, commercial licensees
can shelter themselves from devastating losses.' 8 ' In contrast, the
dissent observed, social hosts possess no ability to spread such
173 See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 566, 476 A.2d at 1233-34 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
174

Id. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).

175 Id. at 567-68, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent noted

that the majority's opinion left many unanswered questions concerning the scope
of a social host's duty. Id. For example, the dissent asked whether
the host [is] obligated to use physical force to restrain an intoxicated
guest from drinking and then from driving? Or is the host limited to
delay and subterfuge tactics short of physical force? What is the result
when the host tries to restrain the guest but fails? Is the host still liable?
Id.
176 See id. at 567, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
177 See infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
178 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
179 See id.
180 Id. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
181 See id.
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losses among their guests.l 8 2 Justice Garibaldi also stated that the
majority's contention that homeowners' insurance will cover such
liability was completely unsubstantiated. 8 3 Consequently, the
dissent warned that the majority's decision may result in "catastrophic" losses to many social hosts.'" 4
Concluding her dissent, justice Garibaldi could find little
solace in the fact that the New Jersey Legislature has the ability to
reverse the Kelly decision. 1 5 The dissent faulted the majority for
misinterpreting the absence of dram shop legislation in New
Jersey.'8 6 In justice Garibaldi's view, New Jersey's legislative efforts to combat the problem of drunken driving constituted unequivocal proof that the Legislature is active in the area. 18 7 Justice
Garibaldi thus concluded that the court should have deferred to
the Legislature; only then, she opined, could the courts be sure
that imposition of social host liability would properly serve the
dictates of accepted New Jersey public policy.' 88
Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of the Kelly decision is
the majority's belief that a social host will be able to tell when a
guest is intoxicated. The majority never considered the actual
knowledge of the Zaks with respect to Gwinnell's level of intoxication. Rather, on the basis of Gwinnell's objectively verified
blood alcohol level, it concluded that the Zaks must have realized
that he was visibly intoxicated. 8 9 Readily available medical research, however, strongly contradicts this type of inferential reasoning. 9 ° Alcohol affects everyone differently, and the effects of
excessive consumption on any given drinker are rarely apparent
to the subjective onlooker."'i A controlled study by James W.
Langenbucher and Peter E. Nathan of Rutgers University showed
that neither social hosts nor commercial bartenders could accurately determine whether test subjects were drunk - even when
182

See id.

Id., 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi noted that,
even if present homeowners' policies did cover host liability, it was unrealistic to
believe that the majority's decision would not cause a rise in premiums. Id.
184 Id., 476 A.2d at 1234-35 (Garibaldi,.J., dissenting).
185 Id., 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 569, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
187 See id.
183

188 See id. at 569-70, 476 A.2d at 1235-36 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
189 See id. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
190 See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
191 Langenbucher & Nathan, Psychology, Public Policy, and the Evidence for Alcohol
Intoxication, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1070, 1076-77 (1983); Perr, supra note 169, at 29
("heavy drinker may still not appear intoxicated even with a blood [alcohol] level of

0.20%").
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those subjects were, in fact, legally intoxicated.19 2 In addition,
other studies have shown that heavily intoxicated persons often
can mask the symptoms of intoxication and feign sobriety before
the subjective onlooker.' 93 In view of these studies, the Kelly decision has placed an impossible burden on social hosts by requiring them to determine when their guests are intoxicated. While
hindsight may be the best teacher, objective tests, which reveal a
guest's level of intoxication after an accident, do not necessarily
prove that the guest appeared to be drunk in the subjective eye of
his host.
Another shortcoming of the Kelly decision is the majority's
failure to outline clearly the duties of social hosts who choose to
serve liquor to their adult guests.' 9 4 How far a host must go in
attempting to stop a drunken and potentially obnoxious guest
from driving remains unclear. 195 In addition, the Kelly opinion
does not consider the added difficulties in determining a guest's
level of intoxication for hosts who choose to drink with their
guests. The majority offers little guidance as to whether its subjective test will take into account the social host's own alcohol96
affected state in determining whether he has acted negligently.
Certainly, there are steps a host might take in order to minimize
the chances of being exposed to Kelly-type liability. Taking the
car keys from the guests who will be drinking, checking guests
closely before they leave, and offering intoxicated guests a bed
for the night are all obvious ways by which a social host can ensure that guests do not suffer alcohol-related automobile accidents. The Kelly decision does not guarantee, however, that a
social host who takes any or all of these precautions will escape
liability if a drunken guest injures a third party in an automobile
accident. Thus, the circumstances under which a host may be
subject to the liability that Kelly imposes is left largely to the
192 Langenbucher & Nathan, supra note 191, at 1076-77. Langenbucher and Nathan concluded that "[w]hether a person is sober or intoxicated is not a matter of
common observation; rather, it requires special skill and special training." Id. at
1077 (emphasis in original).
193 See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N, ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER: A
MANUAL ON THE MEDICOLEGAL ASPECTS OF CHEMICAL TESTS FOR INTOXICATION 36
(1968). But cf. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., Fifth Special Report to the
U.S. Congress on Alcohol and Health 25 (1983) (test subjects could not totally
mask symptoms of intoxication).
194 See supra note 175.
195 See id.
196 See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 567, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that "[i]t would be anomalous to create a rule of liability that social hosts
can deliberately avoid by becoming drunk themselves." Id.
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guesswork of the New Jersey citizenry. The majority's openended imposition of liability offends the sensibilities of the normal person who wants to know the specific duties of hosts who
choose to serve alcoholic beverages. In addition, the damoclean
threat of liability may have a crippling effect on the commonly
accepted process of social interchange, which is often supplemented by the moderate consumption of alcoholic beverages.
An undesirable consequence of the Kelly opinion is the specter of increased litigation.' 9 7 The Kelly majority's failure to outline specifically the duties of social hosts increases the probability
that host negligence will be asserted as a contributing factor in
every alcohol-related accident involving partygoers. 9 8 The majority's belief that its decision will not increase litigation 19 is tenuous in light of the fact that the Kelly rationale has already been
extended to cover business hosts in social situations. 20 0 Justice
Garibaldi appears correct in citing "the almost limitless implications of the majority's decision" as a reason why judicial determination of host liability was improper.2 0 ' The possibility of
increased litigation is an unfortunate and unnecessary by-product of the Kelly decision.
Particularly distressing is the Kelly court's failure to address
fully the potentially destructive effects that its decision might
have for social hosts. The majority's belief that homeowners' insurance will cover the costs of host liability is unsubstantiated,
and, even if homeowners' insurance does cover such liability, the
Kelly decision is certain to cause an increase in premiums. 20 2 It is
quite possible that such price increases will make the cost of insurance prohibitive for many homeowners. In any event, the potential burden of increased insurance premiums is an
unfortunate result of the majority's judicial activism. Homeowners cannot spread the costs of increased insurance premiums
among their guests in the same way that commercial licensees
197 See id. Justice Garibaldi recognized that "[i]t is unrealistic to assume that the
standards set down by the [majority] will not be applied to hosts in other social
situations." Id. Thus, in her opinion, the Kelly decision "leaves the door open for all
of the speculative and subjective impositions of liability that [the dissent] fear[ed]."
Id.
198 See supra note 197.
199 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230.
200 See, e.g., Davis v. Sam Goody, Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 423, 480 A.2d 212 (1984)
(holding conventional negligence analysis of Kelly applies to business hosts serving
liquor).
201 See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 560, 476 A.2d at 1230 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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can spread costs among their customers.2 °3
The New Jersey Legislature has enacted a broad automobile
insurance scheme that is designed to provide adequate recovery
for accident victims.

2 4

The integrity of that scheme as a means of

adequate recovery for the victims of drunken driving should be
respected by New Jersey courts. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Garibaldi persuasively argued that only through a thorough
legislative study can the adequacy of the recovery provided by
New Jersey's insurance legislation properly be determined.20 5
Similarly, any alternatives or additions to this insurance legislation, including any imposition of host liability, should also be
studied by the Legislature before being adopted as law.20 6
California's treatment of the social host liability issue supports the argument that any determination concerning host liability is best left to the state legislature.20 7 In 1978, the
California Supreme Court imposed host liability similar to that
adopted in the Kelly decision.20 8 Later that year, California's legislature effectively overruled that decision by immunizing social
hosts from liability for the injuries caused by intoxicated
guests. 2009 California's experience with host liability clearly was
not important to the Kelly majority, but it nevertheless raises the
possibility that the New Jersey Legislature will closely examine
the Kelly decision in the future.21 0
Preliminary indications are that the Kelly decision is not as
Id., 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Id. at 564, 476 A.2d at 1232-33 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985); id. § 39:6A-14 (West 1973); id.
§ 39:6-73 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985)).
205 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
206 See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 569, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
207 See infra notes 208 & 209 and accompanying text.
208 Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 147, 577 P.2d 669, 670, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534, 535 (1978).
209 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714(b), (c) (West Cum. Supp. 1984). The California statute provided that "[n]o social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person
shall be held legally accountable for damages suffered by such person, or for injury
to the person or property of, or death of, any third person, resulting from the consumption of such beverages." Id. § (c).
210 It is noteworthy that in January 1984 a bill was introduced for consideration
in the New Jersey Assembly that would effectively exempt New Jersey hosts from
the liability the Kelly decision imposes. A.43, Leg., Sess., 1984 N.J. The bill provides
in pertinent part:
No person, other than a person licensed according to the provisions of
Title 33 of the Revised Statutes to sell alcoholic beverages, who furnishes any alcoholic beverage to a person at or over the age at which a
person is authorized to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages shall
be civilly liable to any person or the estate of any person for personal
203
204
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popular as the majority believed it would be.2 ' Public concern
with the decision has been apparent since the Kelly court first imposed social host liability, 21 2 and several respected and influential figures - including state assemblymen 2 13 and well-known
media sources2 14 - have expressed grave doubts concerning the
wisdom of the supreme court's decision. Most critics of the decision believe that the supreme court has usurped a function that is
more appropriately exercised by the Legislature.2 15 Some state
assemblymen have said that the Kelly majority was hasty in imposing host liability without fully examining the possible broad effects of its decision. 216 The Legislature is the governmental body
which is most responsive to the people, and if the court's decision is as publicly unpopular as initial reactions would suggest,
the probable course for the New Jersey Legislature will be to
eliminate Kelly entirely.
While stopping drunken driving is an almost universally accepted goal of modern society, the proper means to achieve that
goal are not unlimited. Any reasonable law designed to curb the
problem of drunken driving must logically be tailored to penalize
those who are ultimately responsible for alcohol-related injuries
the intoxicated drivers. In light of the majority's reliance on
after-the-fact blood test results,2 17 the imposition of liability on
hosts who may legitimately fail to perceive correctly a guest's degree of intoxication is distinctly probable. The Kelly decision has
necessarily made it most prudent for social hosts to refrain eninjuries or property damage inflicted as a result of the intoxication by
the consumer of the alcoholic beverages.
Id.
211 See, e.g., Legal Rulings Befuddle Liability of Party Hosts, Star-Ledger, Aug. 12,
1984, at 23, col. 5; A Study on Host Liability, Star-Ledger, July 14, 1984, at 3, col. 4.
212 See articles cited supra note 11.
213 A Study on Host Liability, Star-Ledger, July 14, 1984, at 3, col. 4; Letter from
Robert P. Hollenbeck to James B. Clark (Nov. 27, 1984).
214 WPIX Editorial No. 84-118, July 11, 1984. This editorial stated in part:
The management of WPIX is fully aware of the death and devastation
caused by drunk drivers, and accepts that society is justified in going to
extreme measures to reduce it, but we agree with the one dissenting
Justice who believes this action is unwise because of what she called "the
almost limitless implications" of the decision. We think the Justice is
right in believing that if such liability is warranted, it should be adopted
by legislative action after very careful study.
Id.
215 See supra notes 213 & 214.
216 See A Study on Host Liability, Star-Ledger, July 14, 1984, at 3, col. 4.
217 See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1221; id. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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tirely from serving alcoholic beverages to their guests. For this
reason, the Kelly decision would appear to infringe upon the accepted rights of citizens who choose to serve alcoholic beverages
to their guests, and the supreme court has employed questionable means to achieve what is otherwise a most desirable end the elimination of drunken driving.
James B. Clark III

